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SINCE the second World War an increasing number of complex situations
have arisen in which governments, private interests and international organi-
zations have been involved with each other. The extraterritorial application
of the United States antitrust laws,1 for example, has created a whole range
of problems for corporations. Various takings of private property by nation-
alization, the most recent being the Suez Canal case, have raised questions of
the rights and duties of states, as well as those of private individuals, and
how they can be accommodated and enforced. In the field of international
organization arise such matters as the effect of resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly, recently considered by the International Court of
Justice, and the principles to be applied by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal when dealing with the rights of United Nations employees having
tenure.
In considering principles of law applicable to such differing types of situ-
ations, the teacher, the judge or the practitioner may need to draw on various
fields of law, now quite separately organized and classified. In one case, it
may become important to examine and apply principles of conflict of laws, and
public international law, as well as the rules arbitrators consider in deciding
controversies according to legal principles specified by agreement. It has thus
become necessary to cut across the lines of various legal disciplines. Unless
this process is recognized, relevant sources of law, and hence precedent, may
be ineffectively interpreted or even overlooked.
Philip C. Jessup, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Di-
plomacy at Columbia University, addresses himself to this problem in the three
Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence delivered at the Yale Law School in February
1956. They are printed without substantial change as three essays entitled
Transuational Law. This arresting title emphasizes Jessup's view of the need
to look into various fields of law when considering actions and events transcend-
ing national frontiers.
Transnational law is not likely to become a term of art for a new body of
law, nor does Jessup so intend it. He is not suggesting a new sort of "brooding
omnipresence" to be known by this title. Instead, he suggests an approach to
what has been called the international sector of law. This approach, he says,
supplies a larger storehouse of rules, which can be used without having to
decide that a case should be governed by public or private law. In this con-
nection, he addresses very directly law teachers and law schools when he states
that if students "are nourished on the pap of old dogmas and fictions, it is not
to be expected that they will later approach the solution of transnational prob-
lems with open-minded intelligence instead of open-mouthed surprise." 2
1. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), decree issued, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; British Nylon Spinners, Ltd.
v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.).
2. Pp. 108-09.
1957]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Jessup has not been alone in thinking and writing about this problem. For
example, C. Wilfred Jenks, 3 writing contemporaneously, considers that the
substance of law has kept up with changing needs to a remarkable extent, but
he feels that the existing concepts of the structure and arrangements of interna-
tional law need reexamination. Although it does not reflect reality to state that
international law deals exclusively with relations between states, this area of law
is certainly one part of any system of law. Hence, Jenks suggests work on
a new classification or arrangment of fields of law. This would lead to an alterna-
tive conception of international law as representing "the common law of man-
kind in an early stage of its development," and comprising "a numbdr of main
divisions of which the law governing the relations between States is only one."
Jessup and Jenks would probably agree on the nature of the problem; they
would concur that their respective approaches are experimental, and that they
are discussing, in part, law as it should be expected to develop. Jessup empha-
sizes a procedure for approaching the concrete case, whereas Jenk's principal
emphasis is on a new classification. Jessup observes, although not comment-
ing on Jenk's views, that his own approach, at least for the time being, is to
"avoid further classification of transnational problems and further definitions
of transnational law."
4
The first chapter of Jessup's volume analyzes the universality of human prob-
lems, the second, the power of judicial tribunals to deal with them; and the
third suggests what law could be applied to their solution. In developing his
theory that human problems are universal, Jessup begins with three "dramas
in two scenes." One describes the case of M. v. F. Mary married Frank many
years ago when she was feeble and he was strong and domineering. Now
Frank runs her life and she sees her friends Bernice and Philippa leading lives
of their own, so she wants a divorce. In the second scene Morocco "married"
France many years ago when she was weak. Now the protected life has palled,
and she has gone to the United Nations to get independent life like Burma
and the Philippines.
This amusing and provocative device raises at once the question of what the
behavioral sciences know and can offer about relationships between states and
relationships between individuals. The issue is how far states and individuals
act in the same way or differently. Arguably, states do not have feelings, wishes
and ideas directly comparable to those of individuals. Thus one may agree
that problems are universal, but still hope for further research on parallels
between procedures for handling disputes between individuals and between
states. The author does not go beyond saying that if there are common elements
in the domestic and international dramas, greater experience in analyzing the
former may help solve the latter.5
The power to deal with problems, the second chapter of the book, is a con-
cise analysis of theories of jurisdiction which have been advanced by tribunals






in dealing with transnational, civil and criminal cases. Jessup shows, with
concrete illustrations, how far in practice tribunals have abandoned their sole
reliance on the territorial theory of jurisdiction, as classicly formulated by
Holmes in the Banana Company case.6 This analysis leads the author to con-
clude that the power element in jurisdiction is the degree ofpossibility that the
state's action will be effective. Therefore it would be the function of trans-
national law to proceed from the premise that jurisdiction is essentially a matter
of procedure "in the manner most conducive to the needs and convenience of
all members of the international community.' 7
Jessup opens his third chapter with the dilemma presented by the British Ny-
Ion Spinners case,8 which he says illustrates the problems arising when present
theories of jurisdiction are applied to transnational situations. He suggests an
alternative approach: why, he asks, should not juridical tribunals be able to
apply a principle of lex conveniens-selecting, within certain limitations, what
they consider the most effective law? He recognizes that this might result in
a tribunal applying its own notions of law, and he describes instances in which
something of this sort has occurred. Thus, he concludes that a tribunal dealing
with a transnational problem should feel free to apply one or more of the bodies
of law into which the field of law is traditionally divided. Here he seems to
come close to the point of view of Jenks that the need for a new approach to
transnational questions is one of classification.
Throughout the book Jessup uses thought-provoking illustrations. For ex-
ample, he suggests a similarity in the development and use of United Nations
forums and procedures as a means for evolving a social consciousness, and
the development and use of minority stockholders' rights. Thus, in the world
contest between the haves and the have-nots he concludes that if something
is not done by the haves to resolve the conflict, then the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly may be the alternative to domestic violence or international war.
Jessup further concludes that when one considers foreign capital which
has moved into underdeveloped countries for economic reasons, a balance
needs to be struck between the interests of the underdeveloped country and
the owners of such private capital. He infers that the balance is now weighted
in favor of private capital. Thus he would expect, in the future, some form of
United Nations regulation, perhaps along the lines suggested by the United
Nations Committee on Restrictive Business Practices,9 as a development of
transnational law.
In the light of the Suez Canal Company nationalization and of similar ex-
periences in other parts of the world, there is much interest in how transnational
law may be expected to develop. To assure the performance of agreements,
6. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
7. P. 71.
S. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch.
19 (C.A.).
9. UNITED NATIONS EcONOMIC AND SocIA. COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc Com-
M IIEME ON RESTucnvE BusINEss PRActicEs, SuPp. No. 11 (Doc. No. E/2380) (1953).
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controversies between states and private individuals must be decided by law
and not by unilateral political action. Hence this reviewer feels that in the
United Nations organs, as outside, the balance is much in favor of the state,
even -though such state may be comparatively small and weak.
Within the necessary limitation of three chapters, Jessup suggests a way of
thinking about law in a complex field. He continues his analysis begun in the
Introduction to his Modern Law of Nations,1° but adds an outline for "much
more exploration and analysis." The author's illustrations show directions in
which he would hope and expect that law will develop. Here he opens up
questions to which he attempts no definitive answers. There will be differences
of view about the implications of some of these illustrations.
This volume is both stimulating and provocative. It effectively makes the
transition from general principle to concrete case, and it provides insights
which can insulate the reader from complete surprise when confronted by
problems for which the digests supply no quick answers or leads. The author's
warmth, his strong, personal views on specifics, and not least of all his humor,
make the pages come alive.
JAM-Es N. HYnat
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